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Abstract 
 
Modernisation has been a key objective of many national governments for at 
least the last two decades. A significant element of the modernisation agenda has 
been the focus on improving the governance of public sector and, more recently, 
voluntary sector organisations. In the UK voluntary sport sector, this has 
involved policy statements, governance monitoring systems linked to public 
funding and a number of ‘good governance’ guides, aimed primarily at the 
boards of national governing bodies of sport (NGBs). Previous research has 
critically analysed modernisation and explored its effects, most often at a macro 
level. Very little research, to date, however, has looked at the influence of 
modernisation on the boards of NGBs. This article seeks to do just that, drawing 
on the first national survey of board-level governance in the UK and an in-depth, 
longitudinal case study of one UK-based NGB. It empirically examines which 
board roles NGBs consider most important and statistically compares large and 
small NGBs. It then draws on direct observation of board and committee 
 meetings, in-depth interviews and analysis of key organisational documents to 
examine how modernisation influences the way board members perceive and 
enact their roles. In so doing, this article draws together the political science 
research on modernisation and the sport governance research on board roles and 
seeks to promote closer integration between these complementary streams of 
research. 
 
Introduction  
 
Modernisation – under one label or another – has been a conspicuous element of 
government policy in the UK and elsewhere since at least the 1980s. In the UK, 
it was especially prominent under successive Labour governments from 1997 to 
2010 and it has continued under the Conservative-led coalition and current 
Conservative governments. During this period, modernisation has had a major 
impact on a range of public services, including local government (Hartley et al. 
2002), health (Blackler 2006) and welfare (Powell 2008). It has also – and this 
provides the context for this article – had a major impact on the voluntary sport 
sector. 
 
One significant aspect of the modernisation agenda has been a focus on 
governance. Indeed, Finlayson (2003, p. 65) argued that, in the UK, New Labour 
practised ‘not only the modernisation of governance but a kind of governance 
through modernisation’. In the voluntary sport sector, this has involved policy 
statements on governance reforms, the establishment of governance monitoring 
systems linked to public funding and the development and promotion of a 
 number of ‘good governance’ guides, focused primarily on the boards of national 
governing bodies of sport (NGBs). As part of the modernisation agenda, 
therefore, central governments and national sport agencies in various countries 
have deliberately attempted to influence the way that boards of NGBs operate. 
 
But how has this influence been experienced by those within NGBs? In 
particular, how has modernisation influenced the way NGB board members 
perceive and enact their roles? This is a question that has seldom been addressed 
directly in the academic literature. Political science researchers have looked at 
the impact of modernisation on NGBs, but have rarely examined its influence on 
the perceptions and actions of individual board members. Conversely, 
governance researchers have looked at the way NGB board members perceive 
and enact their roles, but have rarely examined the influence of modernisation on 
these perceptions and actions. The question is significant, however, as NGBs are 
arguably the key ‘delivery agents’ in the voluntary sport sectors of many 
countries (Houlihan and Lindsey 2012, Sam and Macris 2014) and boards are the 
key decision-making entities within NGBs. This article seeks to address the 
question directly through empirical analysis of a UK-wide survey of NGB board-
level governance and a single, longitudinal case study of a UK-based NGB. In so 
doing, it seeks to promote closer integration between political science and 
governance researchers in the area of sport policy. 
 
The article is structured as follows. The next section provides further background 
on modernisation, with a particular focus on the voluntary sport sector in the UK. 
The following section examines the political science literature on modernisation 
 and the governance literature on board roles and professionalisation, arguing that 
there is a gap between these areas of focus, primarily to do with level of analysis. 
The following section describes the methods used in the current study and the 
section after that presents analysis of the key findings. It looks first at what roles 
board members consider to be most important (and how this differs between 
large and small NGBs) and  then at how board members perceive and enact their 
roles and how this is shaped by elements of the modernisation agenda. Finally, 
the article draws conclusions and offers suggestions on how to move research in 
this area forward. 
 
The context: Modernisation in the voluntary sport sector 
 
Modernisation, despite its significance to government agendas in the UK and 
elsewhere, remains an elusive concept. Houlihan and Green (2009, p. 679) 
suggest that it can be understood variously as: a set of themes, such as 
managerialism, choice and responsiveness; a set of more concrete principles, 
such as partnership development and stakeholding; a set of tools, such as 
inspection and audit; and a wider narrative, which has negatively framed 
bureaucratic government practices, while privileging managerial knowledge and 
equating modernisation with social progress. In addition, Grix (2009) argues that 
modernisation is closely related, but not interchangeable, with concepts of ‘new 
managerialism’, ‘new public management’, ‘managerialisation’ and 
‘governmentality’. 
 
 Modernisation, as a term, is most associated in the UK with successive New 
Labour governments. However, analysis suggests it should be understood as one 
element of a much broader neo-liberal agenda (Newman 2001, du Gay 2003, 
Clarke 2004). Indeed, for many observers, modernisation under New Labour 
represented a continuation of previous Conservative efforts to reform the civil 
service – e.g. through ‘stimulating more entrepreneurship’ and ‘making civil 
servants more individually responsible’ (du Gay 2003, p. 675) – and 
demonstrated affinities with the U.S. as ‘part of a transatlantic neo-liberalism’ 
(Clarke 2004, p. 44). Furthermore, modernisation, located within this broader 
neo-liberal agenda, has been criticised as inherently contradictory. As du Gay 
(2003, p. 675) put it, modernisation: 
 
involves a double movement of ‘responsibilization and autonomization’. Organizations 
and other agents that were once enmeshed in what are represented as the ‘bureaucratic’ 
lines of force of the ‘social’ state are to be made more responsible for securing their own 
future survival and well-being. Yet, at one and the same time, they are to be steered 
politically from the centre ‘at a distance’ through the invention and deployment of a host 
of techniques that can shape their actions while simultaneously attesting to their 
independence—techniques such as audits, devolved budgets, relational contracts and 
performance-related pay. 
 
Such critical analysis alerts us to both positive and negative consequences of the 
modernisation ‘project’, issues we explore later in the article. 
 
In the voluntary sport sector in the UK, a number of specific factors have 
reinforced the ‘modernisation imperative’ (Charlton and Andras 2003) generally 
evident elsewhere. First, the introduction of the National Lottery in 1994 meant 
 that sport organisations started to receive higher levels of public funding 
something that has been accompanied by increased expectations around 
governance and accountability. Second, and related, there have been a number of 
examples of poor management and governance failures among NGBs (e.g. the 
British Athletics Federation (see Grix 2009)). Third, sport has increasingly been 
seen as a way to address wider social policy objectives, such as reducing crime 
and improving education, which has entailed a greater focus on the needs of end-
users and the development of public-private partnerships (Coalter 2007). Finally, 
and more broadly, there has been the general process of ‘professionalisation’ 
within voluntary sector sport, described by Shilbury et al. (2013, p. 353) as 
‘sport’s transition from volunteer-delivered amateur sport to professionally 
managed and delivered sport supported by volunteers’. 
 
This general process of professionalisation among NGBs is closely bound up 
with, and not easily separable from, the processes associated with modernisation. 
For example, Kikulis (2000, p. 293) stated that professionalisation, at a basic 
level, has been driven by ‘the growth of these organizations and the complexity 
of demands placed upon them’. This suggests a general process driven largely by 
commercialisation. However, in many cases, this growth is a direct result of 
increased government investment and the ‘complexity of demands’ refers 
primarily to the accountability ‘technologies’ and associated tensions among 
stakeholders that accompany public investment and modernisation reforms 
(Slack 1985, Slack and Hinings 1992, Hoye and Cuskelly 2003, Ferkins and 
Shilbury 2015). This makes it difficult both to conceptualise modernisation and 
professionalisation in empirical research and to assess the relative influence of 
 each set of processes on organisational governance. Kikulis (2000, p. 313) made 
this point when she called for research that could tease out ‘whether market 
forces or institutional pressures have a greater impact on organizations’. We 
return to this issue later. 
 
Within the broad modernisation agenda, as noted above, there has been a 
particular focus on improving the governance of organisations. In the voluntary 
sport sector in the UK, this has involved reform of the two key non-departmental 
public bodies responsible for distributing funding, UK Sport and Sport England 
(Houlihan and Green 2009), and ongoing attempted reform of NGBs. Such 
attempts to ‘modernise’ governance were made clear in a succession of sport 
policy documents, such as A Sporting Future for All (DCMS 2000) and Game 
Plan (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002), which both stated that NGBs would receive 
increased control over the allocation of public funding, provided they became 
more accountable and implemented robust management and planning systems. 
 
They have also been evident in a succession of programmes, such as: the NGB 
Modernisation Programme, established in 2001 and administered by UK Sport; 
the Funded Partner Assurance Programme, administered by Sport England to 
ensure funded NGBs were ‘fit’ to receive public funds; and ‘Mission 2012’, set 
up by UK Sport in 2007 to focus on the performance of Olympic NGBs in the 
run-up to London 2012. Alongside these programmes, a number of agencies have 
published guidelines setting out the supposed principles and practices of good 
governance. For example, UK Sport published Good governance: A guide for 
national governing bodies of sport (UK Sport 2004), the Sport and Recreation 
 Alliance published the Voluntary code of good governance for the sport and 
recreation sector (Sport and Recreation Alliance 2011, 2014) and Sport England 
published On board for better governance (Sport England, 2012). These 
guidelines focus primarily on the board as ‘the strategic decision-making 
function at the top of an organisation’ (Sport and Recreation Alliance 2014, p. 7). 
 
Together, we can see these policy statements, programmes and governance 
guidelines as some of the more tangible elements of modernisation in voluntary 
sport. They represent an attempt by central government and the (reformed) 
national sport agencies to modernise the governance of NGBs, with a focus on 
their boards. Alongside (or encompassing) this, we can see a more general 
process of professionalisation, in which NGBs are moving ‘from volunteer 
driven entities to those experiencing the forces of commercialisation and the 
infusion of paid staff to fulfil roles historically performed by volunteers’ (Ferkins 
and Shilbury 2014, p. 4). But how has the modernisation agenda actually 
influenced how NGB board members perceive and enact their roles? This is the 
central question of this article. Next, therefore, we turn to the academic literature 
on modernisation and governance to see what studies so far have found. 
 
The research: Modernisation and organisational governance 
 
Research on modernisation has typically examined its rationale(s), its 
implementation and its effects (Midwinter 2001, Newman 2001, Hartley et al. 
2002). Most research to date has focused on the public sector, including health 
(Blackler 2006), welfare (Powell 2008) and local government (Hartley et al. 
 2002), although some has also looked at the voluntary sector (e.g. Lewis 2005, 
Elstub and Poole 2014). Much of the research so far has critically assessed the 
claims made by politicians and policy makers that modernisation would lead to 
greater autonomy and empowerment for service providers. For example, 
Newman (2001) argued early on that such proposed autonomy was inherently 
incompatible with the managerialist approach of New Labour (and the previous 
Conservative government). And studies of local government (e.g. Lusted and 
O’Gorman 2010) have indeed found that modernisation has not led to 
empowerment, but rather to the implementation of national government policies 
underpinned by increasing audit and regulatory oversight. 
 
Drawing on this and some of the critical analysis discussed earlier (e.g. du Gay 
2003), it is possible to highlight two of the key tensions within the modernisation 
‘project’. First, the ‘false autonomy’ identified above means that, as Houlihan 
and Green (2009) argue, modernisation can be understood as an example of 
‘government at a distance’ (Rose 1999, p. 49), in that government does not 
directly impose its authority, but creates pressures to ‘modernise’ that are strong 
enough to ensure changes in organisational behaviour. Second, as Newman 
(2001) found, many organisations adopt the ‘language and technologies’ of 
modernisation (e.g. around long-term strategic planning), but this is primarily 
directed at funders and other external stakeholders and does not always (or even 
often) serve as a guide to internal decision making. We explore these tensions in 
more detail later in the article. 
 
 In the voluntary sport sector in the UK, a number of studies have directly 
examined modernisation and its effects on governance. For example, Houlihan 
and Green (2009) provided a detailed analysis of modernisation processes in 
Sport England and UK Sport; Grix (2009) examined the influence of 
modernisation on the governance of British Athletics, the NGB for athletics in 
the UK; and Adams (2011) looked at the effects of modernisation on voluntary 
sports clubs. In addition, a number of studies have examined key aspects of 
modernisation within sport policy through notions of ‘network governance’ – in 
county sports partnerships (Phillpots et al. 2011), in school sport (Phillpots and 
Grix 2014), in voluntary sports clubs (Adams 2014) and in the sport policy sector 
as a whole (Grix and Phillpots 2011). Alongside this, international research has 
examined the impact of modernisation on national sport organisations in 
Australia (Hoye 2003, Stewart et al. 2004), Canada (Thibault and Harvey 1997), 
New Zealand (Sam 2009, Sam and Marcis 2014) and elsewhere. 
 
To summarise crudely, this research has suggested that the promise of increased 
autonomy for service providers and the supposed shift from ‘big government’ to 
a form of decentralised network governance have not materialised. Instead, 
modernisation processes have led to lines of accountability being drawn upwards 
to national sport agencies, central government and commercial sponsors 
(Houlihan and Green 2006, Sam 2009) and the intensification of hierarchical, 
central control (Grix and Phillpots 2011). Overall, this stream of research 
provides significant insight into modernisation in the voluntary sport sector and 
the changing patterns of relationships and resource dependencies. 
 
 To date, however, this stream of research has seldom examined the influence of 
modernisation on the perceptions and actions of individual board members. In 
the main, this is because it is located within political science, which typically 
analyses governance at a macro or meso level. When research has sought to 
examine the influence of modernisation on NGBs at a more micro level, this has 
focused primarily on executives, performance directors, or coaches, rather than 
board members (Grix 2009, Macris and Sam 2014, Sam and Macris 2014). This 
means there is a lack of research from within political science that adopts a micro 
level of analysis to examine how modernisation influences NGB board members. 
Such research is potentially crucial, however, as it is the perceptions, actions and, 
ultimately, the decision-making processes of board members that constitute 
organisational governance, the very phenomenon that modernisation often seeks 
to influence. 
 
There is, however, a stream of research that does focus directly on governance 
within NGBs and other sport organisations and more often adopts a micro level 
of analysis, namely non-profit sport governance research (Hoye and Cuskelly 
2007, Doherty and Hoye 2011). This stream of research is located within the 
field of corporate and non-profit governance research and draws on the 
theoretical perspectives of the wider field of management and organisation 
studies. Such research has examined a number of different topics, including: 
board structure and performance (e.g. Papadimitriou 1999, Hoye and Cuskelly 
2003, Taylor and O’Sullivan 2009, Balduck et al. 2010, Hoye and Doherty 
2011); board roles and responsibilities (e.g. Inglis 1997, Shilbury 2001, Sakires 
et al. 2009, Yeh et al. 2009); board cohesion and conflict (e.g. Doherty and 
 Carron 2003, Hamm-Kerwin and Doherty 2010, Kerwin et al. 2011); shared 
leadership (e.g. Auld and Godbey 1998, Hoye 2004, 2006, Ferkins et al. 2009); 
and board involvement in strategy (e.g. Ferkins and Shilbury 2010, 2012, 
Shilbury and Ferkins, 2011). 
 
Of most immediate relevance here is the research on board roles and, so far, it 
has revealed the following basic picture. There is now a relatively well-
established, practitioner-oriented literature on the roles and responsibilities of the 
non-profit sport board. This includes descriptive academic accounts and agency-
developed guidelines, such as those produced by UK Sport (2004), Sport and 
Recreation New Zealand (2004) and the Australian Sport Commission (2005). 
Such literature is useful, in that it can facilitate decision-making and help to 
ensure accountability (Hoye and Cuskelly 2007). However, it has been criticised 
as a form of ‘development by accumulation’ (Kuhn 1996, p. 2, in Carver 2010, p. 
150), whereby ‘academics and practitioners alike can only focus on an 
intermittent slogging from one best practice to the next’. In addition, as Inglis et 
al. (1999) and Hoye and Cuskelly (2007) argue, such literature often fails to 
understand what boards ‘actually do’. 
 
To date, just three published studies have explicitly sought to quantify which 
board roles are considered most important by board members themselves. In the 
earliest example, Inglis (1997) examined Canadian provincial sport bodies, 
looking at the perceptions of both executive directors and board members, and 
identified four composite board roles, which she labelled ‘mission’, ‘planning’, 
‘executive director’ and ‘community relations’. In the next, Shilbury (2001) 
 examined state-level sporting organisations in Victoria, Australia, and 
empirically explored the differences in how paid staff and volunteer board 
members perceived they fulfilled a range of board roles, and how important they 
considered these roles were. He found that executive staff had an increasing 
influence on the management of non-profit sport organisations, although they 
also demonstrated a preference for more board involvement in strategic planning. 
More recently, Yeh et al. (2009) looked at state and national governing bodies in 
Taiwan, which, unlike UK-based NGBs, operate with a dual board structure. 
Their empirical analysis identified four composite director roles – ‘manage 
vision and purpose’, ‘board duty’, ‘human resource and fundraising’ and 
‘stakeholder focus’ – and two composite supervisor roles – ‘monitoring results’ 
and ‘board duty and process’. 
 
This stream of research complements the political science research by focusing 
more directly on sport governance and on board roles in particular. However, it 
too has limitations when it comes to our question of how modernisation has 
influenced the way NGB board members perceive and enact their roles. First, 
none of the studies to date directly examined board roles in UK-based non-profit 
sport organisations, or, in fact, in single-tier national sport organisations 
anywhere. Second, none of the studies specifically examined the influence of 
modernisation on how board members perceived and enacted their roles. 
Although the studies took place within the context of voluntary sport sectors that 
were undergoing various processes of modernisation and professionalisation, 
none of the studies sought to examine directly how these modernisation 
processes were influencing the perceptions and actions of board members. Third, 
 none of the studies involved direct observation of board practices or in-depth 
interviews with board members exploring their roles; instead, they all relied on 
questionnaire surveys. 
 
These latter two limitations have, in fact, been noted within the wider non-profit 
sport governance literature. For example, Shilbury et al. (2013), among others, 
note the distinction between ‘organisational’ governance and ‘systemic’ 
governance and argue that research to date has focused too ‘internally’ on 
boards, without taking sufficient account of how board members are influenced 
by wider pressures within the governance system. Furthermore, they argue that 
understanding in this area has been ‘limited by a research approach that does not 
engage enough with those whose life-world involves the governance of 
organisations, and indeed governance between organisations’ (Shilbury et al. 
2013, p. 351). They and others (e.g. Ferkins and Shilbury 2010, 2012, 2014) 
argue for a much greater focus on governance processes and more in-depth, 
qualitative work, which seeks an ‘insider’s perspective’. 
 
This current study seeks to draw on the strengths of political science and non-
profit sport governance research, while addressing some of their weaknesses. 
Specifically, it uses a questionnaire survey to provide a basic, descriptive picture 
of how UK-based NGB board members perceive their roles. Then, it explicitly 
adopts a micro perspective through an in-depth, qualitative case study to 
understand more precisely how board members perceive and enact their roles and 
how modernisation influences this. As such, it seeks to build on previous 
research on board roles by adopting an insider’s view and by examining ongoing 
 board interaction and decision-making within the wider governance context. In 
the next section, we explain how the study was conducted, before turning, in the 
following section, to an analysis of our findings. 
 
Methods 
 
The survey 
 
We administered a questionnaire survey to all NGBs recognised by each of the 
four home country sports councils in the UK – Sport England, Sport Northern 
Ireland, sportscotland and the Sports Council for Wales. The questionnaire was 
sent to the chair (or equivalent) of the board of each NGB. The questions on 
board roles drew deliberately on previous empirical studies into boards of non-
profit organisations. Specifically, we followed Cornforth’s (2001) study of non-
profit organisations by including 17 board roles and asking respondents to 
indicate how important they considered each role was on a Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 (‘not at all important’) to 4 (‘very important’) and how effective 
they considered they were at performing that role on a scale of 1 (‘not at all 
effective’) to 4 (‘very effective’). We also asked for basic ‘demographic’ 
information, including number of full-time and part-time employees, number of 
volunteers, and so on. We received 75 usable responses from a ‘population’ of 
300 – a response rate of 25 per cent, which is acceptable for a survey of this kind. 
Respondents varied in size, with the smallest having no full-time employees and 
the largest having 300. The mean number of full-time employees was 26 and the 
median was four.
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To analyse the data, we calculated means and standard deviations for each board 
role in relation to how important respondents considered it and how effective 
they considered they were at it. In addition, we examined whether there were any 
significant differences between respondents’ ratings of importance and 
effectiveness (using Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests). We also examined board 
roles in relation to organisational size. Specifically, we tested for statistically 
significant differences between small and large NGBs on the perceived 
importance of, and their perceived effectiveness at, the 17 board roles, using the 
appropriate statistical technique (independent samples Mann-Whitney U Tests). 
 
It is important to note that any distinction between small and large NGBs is 
somewhat arbitrary. In making our distinction, we were led by convention in the 
academic literature. Specifically, Rochester’s (2003) study of board roles in non-
profit organisations, which is one of the only published studies to statistically 
analyse differences between small and large non-profit organisations, used four 
full-time employees as the cut-off between ‘small’ and ‘large’. In our survey, 69 
of the 75 respondents reported how many full-time employees they had, allowing 
us – following Rochester (2003) – to divide respondents into two groups: ‘small’ 
NGBs with four or fewer full-time employees (36 NGBs; 52 per cent) and ‘large’ 
NGBs with more than four full-time employees (33; 48 per cent). There are 
definite limitations to analysing the data in this way. For example, it could be 
that the most important differences exist between those NGBs that have no full-
time employees and those that have at least one full-time employee, as those 
board members in the former group would necessarily have to fulfil both 
 volunteer and executive roles.
ii
 Alternatively, it may be that important 
differences exist between board members in those NGBs that receive public 
funding and those that do not. Future research should certainly examine 
differences between these different groups. In this article, while noting the 
possible limitations, we decided to define ‘small’ and ‘large’ in line with 
previous literature on non-profit organisations. 
 
The case study 
 
The case study employed a process-oriented, longitudinal approach (Pettigrew 
1997). We selected the organisation primarily because it was an NGB funded by 
Sport England and therefore affected, at least in a basic sense, by modernisation 
processes. As such, it constituted an example of what Denzin and Lincoln (1994, 
p. 202) term ‘purposive sampling’. In addition, the board members themselves 
were prepared to allow access to board and committee meetings and key 
organisational documents, constituting what Ferkins and Shilbury (2010, p. 239) 
refer to as ‘a willingness and ability to engage’ and thus, in turn, what Stake 
(2003) refers to as the primary basis for case selection, namely ‘the opportunity 
to learn’. 
 
The organisation itself was formed in 2000 and acts as the development agency 
for two sports in the UK. It has a ‘hybrid board’ (Ferkins and Shilbury 2012, p. 
72), which has 12 members: an independent chair, six ‘federation directors’ 
(elected through the federations of the two sports) and five ‘independent 
directors’. In addition, the organisation has two joint chief executive officers who 
 attend the board (technically as non-voting members, but highly involved). The 
case study period lasted from November 2011 to June 2014, although the bulk of 
the data was collected between November 2011 and December 2012. We 
collected data through direct observation of board and committee meetings, 
semi-structured interviews and key organisational documents (see Table 1 for 
details). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
We recorded all the interviews and transcribed them in full and we wrote up field 
notes from all observations and interviews. Along with the key organisational 
documents, we imported these into NVivo and analysed them. We used a 
‘constant comparative method’ (Miles and Huberman 1994, Thomas 2011) to 
code the data – focusing on board ‘processes’, ‘functions’ and the ‘wider policy 
context’. We proceeded through several iterative stages of coding and, through 
close analysis of the data, we developed our interpretations of how 
modernisation influenced the way board members perceived and enacted their 
roles. We present these interpretations, following the descriptive analysis of the 
survey findings, in the next section. 
 
Findings 
 
Board roles in national governing bodies of sport in the UK 
 
 The survey provided a basic picture of how UK-based NGB boards perceive 
their roles (see Table 2). If we consider ratings of above 3.5 as high, then NGB 
respondents considered six of the 17 roles highly important. The two board roles 
considered most important related to financial oversight and financial systems 
and the next two related to the organisation’s mission and values and strategic 
direction. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
These findings, although basic, might be seen as tentative evidence of NGB 
boards ‘modernising’ by replicating the behaviour of boards in the for-profit 
sector. What might have been considered the traditional roles of (amateur) NGB 
board members – helping to raise funds, acting as a link with other organisations, 
and so on – appear from the survey to be less important now. In particular, 
‘representing the interests of stakeholders in the NGB’, which might previously 
have been considered a crucial role, was considered the fifth least important out 
of 17. The findings also demonstrate clear differences between how important 
particular roles were to boards and how effective they considered they were at 
performing those roles. As noted, six of the 17 roles were rated higher than 3.5 
for importance and, overall, 16 of 17 were rated 3.0 or higher. In terms of 
effectiveness, however, none were rated higher than 3.5 and only seven of 17 
were rated 3.0 or higher.
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The final thing the survey enabled us to explore was whether there were any 
differences in the way large and small NGBs perceived their board roles. The 
 analysis found no statistically significant differences between large and small 
NGBs’ ratings of their effectiveness at any of the 17 board roles.iv However, it 
found several differences in their ratings of importance. Specifically, small 
NGBs considered two board roles more important than large NGBs, namely 
‘representing the NGB externally’ and ‘helping to raise funds or other resources 
for the NGB’, while large NGBs considered two board roles more important than 
small NGBs, namely ‘ensuring the NGB has adequate financial systems and 
procedures’ and ‘monitoring the NGB's performance and taking action when 
required’.v 
 
These results are noteworthy for our central question of how modernisation 
influences the way NGB board members perceive and enact their roles. Just 
above, we suggested that NGBs’ overall ratings of board role importance might 
indicate a general shift from the traditional role of board members in amateur 
non-profit sport organisations (i.e. helping to raise funds and acting as 
ambassadors) to a more professionalised role (i.e. setting financial policy and 
strategy). These size-related differences suggest, however, that such a shift may 
be more evident within large NGBs than small NGBs. This does not negate the 
provisional interpretation that modernisation is influencing how NGBs perceive 
their roles. On the contrary, the fact that large NGBs, who are often publicly 
funded and therefore more directly involved in modernisation processes, appear 
to consider their professionalised role more important than small NGBs provides 
stronger evidence of modernisation’s influence. However, these differences 
should caution us against making claims for all NGBs and should sensitise us to 
the possibility that modernisation influences different NGBs in different ways. 
  
The influence of modernisation on how NGB board members perceive and 
enact their roles 
 
Modernisation, as we have seen, is very difficult to conceptualise and processes 
of modernisation are closely bound up with broader processes of 
professionalisation. In the case study, we sought to focus initially on the 
relatively tangible aspects of modernisation, namely the funding-related 
monitoring system, associated accountability ‘technologies’ and ‘good 
governance’ guidelines. Seeking the ‘insider perspective’, we sought to analyse 
how these aspects of modernisation influenced the way board members 
perceived and enacted their roles. Over time, however, it became clear that 
certain fundamental perspectives, or ‘logics’, were shaping board members’ 
perceptions and actions; and so we sought to account for these too. In the 
following analysis, therefore, we attempt to reconstruct our own interpretive 
process, such that the things we discuss first appeared most prominent to us and 
the things we discuss later emerged as more significant, ‘underlying’ elements 
over time. 
 
The board’s strategic role 
 
First, in relation to strategy, it was clear from regular discussions at board and 
committee meetings that board members deliberately sought to ‘be strategic’ and 
to maintain a distinction between strategy, which they saw as a key part of their 
role, and operations, which they saw as the role of the CEOs and other staff 
 members. For example, in the November 2011 board meeting, in a 45-minute-
long, reflective discussion specifically about the role of the board, one of the 
independent directors emphasised the importance of being strategic. He said: 
‘That’s our fundamental responsibility as a board. I’m not worried about bean 
counting. That’s [the CEOs’] role.’ Likewise, in the November 2012 board 
meeting, the chair discussed the importance of working in what he called ‘that 
strategic space’. He said, ‘Committees, yes, roll your sleeves up, get involved in 
finance, development and so on,’ but the board, he said, should focus on the 
organisation’s mission and vision and how to get there. 
 
This basic perception that the board ought to ‘be strategic’ was also, for the most 
part, reflected in ongoing board practices. For example, in a series of discussions 
at board meetings between November 2011 and March 2012, board members 
developed and agreed an overall vision and mission for the organisation. In 
addition, the board ‘strategised’ through an ongoing process in which members 
of the Development and Strategy Committee discussed the detail of particular 
strategic issues and made recommendations to the board, which the board then 
discussed and decided upon. 
 
But were these perceptions and actions around ‘being strategic’ directly 
influenced by modernisation? This was more difficult to discern. While 
governance monitoring systems and ‘good governance’ guides consistently 
promote the notion of the board ‘being strategic’ – e.g. Sport England (2012, p. 
9) states ‘The Board is strategically, not operationally, focussed’ – the case study 
research did not suggest that these things directly influenced board members’ 
 perceptions and actions around being strategic. Instead, they appeared to draw 
directly on their own experiences from other organisations – for example, the 
chair’s experiences in his day-job at a multinational consulting company and one 
of the independent director’s experiences in her day-job at a law firm. This 
suggested a more fundamental ‘professional logic’ operating at board level – the 
incorporation of ‘institutional ideas for professional and business-like 
management practices’ (Kikulis 2000, p. 294). 
 
Where the influence of modernisation on strategy was immediately and directly 
apparent, however, was in the content of the strategic discussions. Indeed, these 
strategic discussions were very strongly influenced by expectations around what 
Sport England, as the primary funder, would think. As just one example, when 
one of the joint CEOs discussed potential visions and missions at the February 
2012 board meeting and framed his discussion by talking about ‘the three Ps – 
participation, performance and profile’, several board members immediately 
questioned whether Sport England used those particular terms. As one of the 
federation directors said, not without irony, ‘It helps if your main funder speaks 
your language.’ One of the joint CEOs, in her interview, reinforced this sense of 
‘strategically orientating’ the organisation towards the wishes of Sport England. 
She said: 
 
Yeah. I mean, there’s that sort of dichotomy of, you know, the message from Sport 
England is that you should first think about what would be good for your sport. And 
then, you know, they should see what parts of that strategy they would fund. But we 
don’t…in truth, we can’t operate like that. We first think about what they’re willing to 
fund and, you know…and obviously, we’re not talking about things that are 
 diametrically opposed to what would be good for our sports, but yeah, we would 
probably do things slightly differently if it was all about what we thought was best for 
[the two sports]. We know that for [Sport England] right now, it’s participation 
numbers, so that has to be the most important thing to us. 
 
The distinction, then, is a subtle one. While it was clear that modernisation, as 
manifested in the funding relationship between Sport England and the NGB, 
directly influenced how board members made strategic decisions, it was not clear 
that modernisation directly influenced board members’ more basic perception 
that they should ‘be strategic’ (more on this below). 
 
The board’s financial role 
 
This indirect/direct influence of modernisation was also apparent in the way 
board members perceived and enacted their ‘financial role’. As our survey 
indicated, and as much previous empirical research (e.g. Inglis 1997, Shilbury 
2001, Yeh et al. 2009) has shown, non-profit board members generally consider 
their financial role crucial. In the case study too, this was clearly evident in 
financial discussions at board and committee meetings. In addition, certain 
interviewees discussed the importance of a robust financial system. For example, 
one of the joint CEOs said: 
 
In the finance committee, when we were setting up, you know, signing-off authorities 
and financial procedures and all sorts of, you know, expense claims. Yeah, all those 
sorts of budgeting processes. All of that stuff has really helped us just nail much more of 
the administration of the organisation to the point where I think we're very well-
governed, we're very well-structured. 
  
However, there was little evidence that modernisation – in the form of 
governance monitoring or ‘good governance’ guides – directly influenced this 
perception. There was one instance, in the November 2011 board meeting, when 
the chair questioned one of the joint CEOs very closely about some money left 
over from a funded capital project. He said, ‘If Sport England are looking for an 
audit trail, is there a problem with this being the fifth bullet point on a relatively 
insignificant looking report?’ This was followed by a very precise discussion 
about discretionary spending limits, which resulted in a new written policy 
approved by the board. Beyond this, however, there was little evidence that the 
financial reporting linked to Sport England funding, or the wider modernisation 
narrative ‘privileging managerial knowledge’ (Houlihan and Green 2009) 
directly shaped board members’ perceptions around their financial role. Again, 
like their basic sense of ‘being strategic’, their sense of ‘being financially 
responsible’ seemed a more inherent, taken-for-granted aspect of board 
behaviour. 
 
Where modernisation did appear to influence board members’ perceptions and 
actions directly was on the issue of developing commercial revenue streams. 
This related to, but also differed from, the board’s ‘financial role’. One of the 
independent directors, in his interview, explained the distinction as follows: 
 
If you look at the characteristics of the governing body, the finance director is a different 
name for a treasurer, i.e. they keep the books tight and they scrutinise the accounts and 
they report on accounts. [The finance director]’s great at that. You need that, but you 
also need the commercial director. And I think that’s the debate we should have…Now 
 [the joint CEOs] will be the first to admit they don’t know that. So, I think that’s where, 
I’d like to think that’s where the board can move to. 
 
This perception of the need for the board to adopt a more ‘commercial’ role was 
influenced by modernisation in what might be seen as both a ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ sense. In a ‘positive’ sense, Sport England and UK Sport both strongly 
encourage NGBs to develop their commercial capability and thus seek to 
influence board members to adopt a more commercial role. However, in board 
and committee discussions within the case study organisation, this was barely 
mentioned. Instead, modernisation – manifested in the funding relationship 
between the organisation and Sport England – influenced this perception in a 
more ‘negative’ sense. As Sport England funding accounted for around 85 per 
cent of total income and as this to a certain extent determined what the 
organisation had to focus on, board members recognised the need to reduce their 
reliance on this funding in order to achieve greater autonomy and sustainability. 
As one of the CEOs said in the July 2012 Governance Committee meeting, in 
response to a question about what he felt the board needed in terms of expertise, 
‘How we think about income streams, developing independence – lack of 
dependence on grant income, that kind of thing.’ He then said, ‘I think we 
need…someone from a pure commercial background, you know, a FTSE 100 
company.’ The board later sought to enact this more commercial role: in the 
February 2013 Development and Strategy Committee meeting, they invited a 
consultancy company to present proposals ‘to increase the commercial income 
potential of the NGB’. Following this, the board set up a new committee – the 
Commercial Committee – to focus on this specific issue. 
 
 So board members’ experience of the funding and accountability processes 
central to modernisation directly influenced their inclination to adopt a more 
commercial role. Yet, close observation of ‘governance talk’ at board and 
committee meetings revealed that this inclination also stemmed from a more 
fundamental ‘professional logic’ (Kikulis 2000) that was increasingly prevalent 
among board members. For example, in the November 2011 board meeting, the 
new chair introduced himself to the other board members by discussing his day-
job in a multinational consulting company. He said that he intended to ‘bring my 
business background now to sport’. He talked repeatedly about 
professionalisation and how he wanted to ensure the board and the organisation 
‘runs professionally’. Later, in the May 2012 board meeting – the first meeting 
after the appointment of two new board members from business backgrounds – 
the board held a specific, 40 minute discussion about its role and responsibilities. 
This discussion was clearly framed within a ‘professional discourse’. For 
example, one of the new directors asked early on, ‘If this was a business, it 
would be pretty simple. The board’s fiduciary duty is to shareholders. How 
would that translate here? Who are the stakeholders?’ ‘The players are the 
shareholders,’ replied one of the independent directors, ‘The stakeholders are 
Sport England, sponsors and so on.’ Other board members then contributed to 
this discussion. Later, one of the independent directors declared, ‘We’re not a 
business, but we have to be business-like. Return on investment for shareholders. 
We have to maximise that.’ 
 
The board’s representative role 
 
 Finally, the influence of funding requirements, linked to modernisation, was 
clear in the way board members perceived another role discussed earlier, namely 
representing the interests of stakeholders in the NGB. In the survey, this role, 
which might be considered one of the key roles of the traditional (amateur) NGB 
board, was rated low in importance, certainly compared to financial, strategic 
and monitoring roles. We argued above that this could be seen as evidence of the 
way modernisation had influenced NGB board members to perceive the board 
less as a forum to represent local and regional sport structures and more as a 
strategic, commercial decision-making body. And much of the discussion at 
board and committee meetings and in board members’ in-depth interviews bore 
this out. It was not, however, a simple, undisputed perception. As one of the 
board members said in the April 2012 Governance Committee meeting, referring 
to disputes around this perception, ‘If you want to get an elephant and blow it up, 
we can fill the room with it.’ 
 
In short, the conflict centred on whether the federation directors should act as 
‘representatives’ of their federations, or in ‘the best interests’ of the NGB. As 
one of the independent directors said in her interview: 
 
There tends to be an awful lot of sitting in a board meeting, going, “What does [the 
federation] think?” I’m like, “Guys, you’re not here as a director for [the federation], 
you’re here as a director for [the NGB].” So, yes, we can have those conversations, but 
it’s not appropriate to break the walls of the board meeting and ask someone to put on 
their [federation] hat and then berate them for not putting their [NGB] hat on two 
minutes later. 
 
 This is not to say that board members did not consider representing stakeholders’ 
interests as an important part of their role. Indeed, as one of the independent 
directors said, in the November 2011 board meeting, ‘it is important that sport 
owns the sport’. The issue instead was about how this ought to be achieved, i.e. 
whether it should be enacted through direct representation of the federations on 
the board, or whether the board should be composed of skilled, independent 
members, who decide on the strategic direction of the NGB and in this way 
represent the interests of stakeholders. The majority view of the board was the 
latter, although it was not unanimous, as some of the federation directors still felt 
that some element of direct representation was important. 
 
This issue around representation has emerged strongly in recent research on sport 
governance (e.g. Ferkins and Shilbury 2010, 2012, 2015, Shilbury and Ferkins 
2015), reflecting the increasing focus on systemic, rather than organisational, 
governance. Here, our primary concern was how modernisation influenced the 
way board members perceived and enacted their ‘representative role’. And in one 
way, the influence was clear and direct, in that Sport England required that for all 
funded NGBs, ‘All appointments, including those drawn from the membership, 
are informed by skills needs which are regularly assessed and there is evidence 
of a skills-based assessment and appointment process for all Board positions’ 
(Sport England 2012, p. 9). This mandated the notion of a skills-based, rather 
than a simply representative, board. 
 
In another way, however, the influence was more indirect, in that many of the 
policy statements and ‘good governance’ guides simply stated that board 
 members should act in the best interests of the organisation and not simply as 
direct representatives of their constituency. For example, the latest version of the 
Sport and Recreation Alliance’s Voluntary Code of Good Governance states, 
‘Board members are appointed to serve the sport or activity as a whole, not their 
own region, function, background or group’ (Sport and Recreation Alliance 
2014, p. 21). Board members often invoked these prescriptions and guidance in 
their discussion and decision-making processes. For example, in the April 2012 
Governance Committee meeting, the chair of the committee, an independent 
board member, pointed out that Sport England was now ‘RAGging on 
governance [i.e. assessing NGBs using a Red, Amber, Green traffic-light 
system]’. He also specifically brought up the Sport and Recreation Alliance’s 
Voluntary Code: he said, ‘We need to look at where we are with the seven 
principles’ and others agreed. 
 
Later, in the November 2012 board meeting, the board held a specific, 40-minute 
group exercise and discussion around the Code: each board member voted for 
whichever of the seven principles she or he considered most important overall 
and which one the board should focus on immediately. The board considered that 
‘Principle 4: Objectivity: Balanced, Inclusive and Skilled Board’ was the one 
that needed immediate focus and so discussion again shifted to the issue of 
‘representative’ vs. ‘skills-based’ appointments. Most board members again 
emphasised that they felt the board should act as a group of skilled individuals 
‘leading’ the NGB and ‘providing direction’, rather than directly representing 
‘the interests of the federations’. While they recognised that these objectives 
were not mutually exclusive, they also felt – as expressed by the Voluntary Code 
 and the modernisation agenda more broadly – that they should see the board as 
an executive, ‘commercial-type’ entity, rather than a representative forum. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
The survey: Findings and implications 
 
The survey, which examined board-level governance in UK-based NGBs, 
indicated strong similarities with previous research, but also some subtle changes 
over time. As we saw above, UK-based NGB boards rate their financial and 
strategic roles as most important and their roles relating to representation of 
stakeholder interests as less important. In general, these findings accord with 
previous studies in non-profit sport (Inglis 1997, Shilbury 2001, Yeh et al. 2009) 
and in the general non-profit sector (Inglis et al. 1999, Iecovich 2004). 
 
However, we can also discern a subtle trend whereby, over time, these financial 
and strategic roles have become comparatively more important to boards, while 
stakeholder representation roles have become comparatively less important. For 
example, in the earliest study, Inglis (1997) found that the composite board role 
‘Mission’, which included the specific board role ‘Being accountable to the 
members’, was rated higher in importance than the composite board role 
‘Planning’, which included the specific board roles ‘Setting financial policy’ and 
‘Developing and assessing long-range plans and overall strategy for the 
organization’. However, in Shilbury’s (2001) later Australian study, the three 
most important board roles, in order, were: ‘Setting financial policy’, 
 ‘Developing and assessing long range plans’ and ‘Annual budget allocations’, 
while ‘Representing the interest of certain constituents’ was rated sixth out of 
nine. 
 
In our study, continuing this trend, the four most important board roles 
concerned financial management, financial systems, mission and values and 
strategic direction, while ‘ensuring accountability to the NGB's stakeholders’ and 
‘representing the interests of stakeholders in the NGB’ were rated eighth and 
thirteenth respectively. Of course, it is difficult to establish a clear pattern from 
empirical studies conducted in different countries over almost 20 years, but these 
descriptive results offer some indication of a general shift in perception among 
board members towards their financial and strategic roles. This, in turn, might be 
read as the general influence, over time, of modernisation and professionalisation 
on the boards of non-profit sport organisations, emphasising commercial-type 
considerations of finance and strategy and de-emphasising traditional 
considerations of direct member representation. 
 
The other key contribution of the survey to the organisational governance 
literature concerns the differences between large and small NGBs. As we saw, 
large NGBs considered their ‘professionalised’ role – ensuring adequate financial 
systems and monitoring NGB performance – to be more important than did small 
NGBs, while small NGBs considered their ‘amateur/traditional’ role – helping to 
raise funds and acting as ambassadors – to be more important than did large 
NGBs. Discussion within non-profit sport governance has already emphasised 
how volunteer board members in small organisations often have to fill a number 
 of positions and are thus less able to focus on their financial and monitoring 
roles. However, this is the first time that research has empirically tested for 
differences between large and small NGBs. As noted earlier, while our 
designation of large and small NGBs followed previous research into non-profit 
organisations (Rochester, 2003), there may be important differences between 
those NGBs with no full-time employees and those that do have full-time 
employees. While our research did not examine these differences – and this can 
be considered a limitation – future research should seek to do this. 
 
These survey findings have implications, then, for modernisation and governance 
in non-profit sport. In particular, they should sensitise those involved (policy-
makers, academics and practitioners) to the potential differences between large 
and small NGBs. One of the criticisms of the modernisation agenda is that 
governments deliberately advance a narrative of ‘epochal dichotomization’ (du 
Gay 2003, p. 670), which depicts traditional public and voluntary sector 
organisations as out of date, bureaucratic (in a negative sense) and poorly 
performing, in order to legitimise the introduction of a rational, scientific 
management-type approach. This ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach not only tends to 
force accountability ‘upwards’, but also ignores differences between 
organisations – in size, culture and so on – or marginalises those that do not (or 
cannot) easily conform. The fact that boards of small NGBs are often entirely, or 
almost entirely, volunteer-run means they may not easily be able to fulfil the 
financial oversight and long-term strategic planning roles that funders mandate 
as a condition of funding. Small NGBs, therefore, may become progressively 
 marginalised as the wider sporting landscape becomes increasingly shaped by the 
‘contracting’ arrangements typical of modernisation. 
 
The case study: Findings and implications 
 
The case study sought a more fine-grained understanding of NGB board roles 
and, through close observation of ‘governance talk’ and processes of interaction 
and decision-making, sought to examine the influence of modernisation. In short, 
it found that, at times, board members directly invoked the prescriptions of 
funders, or the text of particular governance guides, when constructing and 
enacting their board roles, whereas, at other times, their perceptions and actions 
appeared to be driven more by embedded ‘logics’. So, for example, several of 
their strategic decisions were clearly influenced by what they thought Sport 
England would fund. This supports Green and Houlihan’s (2006, p. 55) argument 
that the rhetoric of modernisation, while emphasising the empowerment of 
NGBs, masks the ‘reality of highly constrained choices of both strategy and 
practice’. On the other hand, their perception that they, as board members, 
should enact a strategic role appeared driven more by a ‘professional logic’. This 
professional logic underpinned much board discussion and decision-making and 
represents what Green and Houlihan (2006, p. 65) termed ‘the absorption of 
values and day-to-day practices typical of the commercial business sphere’. 
 
A key question that emerges from this is to what extent we should also see this 
absorption of commercial values as the influence of modernisation. It is certainly 
true, as noted above, that the modernisation narrative depicts traditional public 
 and voluntary sector ways of working as outdated and inefficient and commercial 
ways of working as modern and efficient (du Gay 2003, Houlihan and Green 
2009). In addition, the ‘tools’ of modernisation – accountability technologies 
(including funding bid processes), ‘good governance’ guidelines and so on – 
reinforce this narrative. This suggests that modernisation, in a broad sense, 
pushes these commercial values. Yet studies of professionalisation within non-
profit sport from the early 1980s onwards (e.g. Schrodt 1983, Beamish 1985) 
have emphasised this absorption of commercial values within NGBs and have 
not attributed it solely to the influence of government funding and associated 
accountability technologies. 
 
Ultimately, as a number of researchers have noted (e.g. Slack and Hinings 1992, 
Kikulis 2000), it is very difficult to determine whether organisational changes 
have been driven by logics that have become institutionalised, or by (more 
immediate) compliance with funding regimes. What our case study did indicate – 
through a focus on ‘governance talk’ and ongoing interaction – was that board 
members’ perceptions of the board’s role as a strategic decision-making group, 
with clear responsibility for effective financial oversight, had a ‘taken-for-
granted’ quality, which appeared based on an increasingly embedded 
professional logic. Certain actions, on the other hand, e.g. particular strategic 
decisions and the timing of those decisions, appeared specifically driven by the 
need to comply with funders’ requirements and were often justified by reference 
to the precepts of modernisation. 
 
 The case study also indicated that while there was consensus among board 
members concerning their strategic and financial roles, there was ongoing 
conflict around the board’s representative role. This issue of delegate 
representation is complex. Indeed, Sam (2009, p. 502) labelled it a ‘wicked 
problem’ and Shilbury et al. (2013, p. 350) noted its ‘important bearing on the 
governing role’. While there was little empirical research on this even five years 
ago, recent studies in Australia and New Zealand (Ferkins and Shilbury 2010, 
2012, 2015, Shilbury and Ferkins 2015) have started to examine it in depth. Our 
study did not set out to focus on this issue, yet, as with Ferkins and Shilbury’s 
(2010) study of strategic capability, it pushed itself to the fore.  
 
While we cannot draw extensive conclusions, our study suggested the key 
practical conflicts around the board’s representative role concerned: recruitment 
to the board (i.e. whether members should be appointed on the basis of their 
skills, or elected through membership structures); and behaviour on the board 
(i.e. whether acting as representatives of particular constituencies comprised 
board members’ abilities to act in ‘the best interests’ of the organisation). It also 
suggested, in light of previous research, that the issue is not one of board 
composition alone. For example, the NGB in our study had a ‘hybrid’ board, i.e. 
both ‘representatives’ and ‘independents’, while those in previous studies had a 
fully appointed board that moved to a hybrid board within the study period 
(Ferkins and Shilbury 2010) and a hybrid board that had recently been a fully 
elected board (Shilbury and Ferkins 2015). Yet in each of these studies, there 
was persistent tension around the issue of representation and, more broadly, 
around the relationship between national and regional levels. Indeed, our study, 
 like the other, recent studies, suggests that this issue is complex and emotive and, 
fundamentally, one of competing logics – the professional logic discussed above 
and a ‘traditional/democratic’ logic that seeks to maintain some form of direct 
local/regional representation on the board. We echo Ferkins and Shilbury’s 
(2015, p. 102) call for more academic research in this area that can explore 
‘options for change that protect the voice of the legal “members-as-owners” and 
acknowledge the sensibility of a democratic process’. 
 
One other thing the case study suggested, concerning the issue of representation 
in the context of modernisation, is that certain board members might seek to 
‘harness’ the modernisation narrative in order to drive change within the board. 
In our study, in board discussions around recruitment, composition and so on, the 
CEOs and independent board members (who generally favoured a fully 
independent, skills-based board) often directly invoked the notion of ‘epochal 
dichotomization’ (du Gay 2003) that is central to the modernisation narrative. 
That is, they invoked the ‘need to embrace change’ and the need to move away 
from the ‘old, traditional, representative model’, in which board members rise 
‘through the ranks’, bolstering their arguments by referring to funder 
expectations and good governance guides. This was notable, given that the same 
board members displayed resistance (or, at least, resentment) when funder 
expectations impinged on their sense of autonomy. Although there is not space 
here to examine this issue in detail, future work on sport governance from within 
an interpretive paradigm might usefully explore the way board members exploit 
or resist modernisation narratives to (re-)shape perceptions and initiate change. 
 
 Finally, this article sought to bring together the political science literature on 
modernisation and the governance literature on board roles. By examining how 
the diffuse processes of modernisation played out in concrete board discussions 
and practices, this article sought to integrate the macro and micro levels of 
analysis that characterise these different streams of research. We argue that this 
integration is fruitful for research on modernisation and for research on 
governance more broadly, as it enables insight into the ‘translation’ of 
institutional processes through different levels. Cornforth (2012, p. 1129) 
recently argued for this in his recent ‘state of the union’ review of non-profit 
governance research, arguing that: 
 
A broader conceptualization of nonprofit governance needs to recognize that boards are 
part of a broader governance system, including regulators, auditors, and other key 
external stakeholders, such as funders, that can place accountability requirements on an 
organization and its board…This opens up a variety of new research questions about 
how different regulatory and funding regimes influence governance structures and 
practices within nonprofit organizations. 
 
This article, by examining the influence of modernisation on board members’ 
perceptions and actions, embraced this broader conceptualisation of governance 
and went some way towards addressing the new research questions that such a 
broader conceptualisation opens up. Future research should build on this and 
develop these insights even further. 
 
                                                        
i
 One issue we sought to address was the possibility of bias due to non-response 
error. We employed the most common method for assessing non-response error, 
namely comparing early to late respondents (Bartlett et al. 2008, Jordan et al. 
                                                                                                                                                      
2011). This involved grouping respondents according to waves of responses and 
testing for any significant differences on key variables, on the premise that those 
who respond late in the data collection cycle are most similar to non-respondents. 
The last two waves of data collection yielded 39 responses (above the 
recommended minimum number of 30), so we tested for any statistically 
significant differences between these 39 ‘late’ respondents and the 36 ‘early’ 
respondents on key variables, such as number of full-time employees, board size 
and overall board effectiveness. No statistically significant differences were 
found. Although late respondents cannot be treated as ‘pure’ non-respondents 
(Jordan et al. 2011), this gives us greater confidence that our 75 respondents are 
representative of the total population of NGBs in the UK. 
ii
 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this observation. 
iii
 In all but one of these cases, these differences were statistically significant 
(using Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests). The difference between importance and 
effectiveness on ‘acting as a link with important groups/organisations your NGB 
deals with’ was not significant (Z = -1.089; p = .276); the differences on 
‘representing the interests of stakeholders in the NGB’ (Z = -2.407; p = .016) and 
‘setting NGB policies’ (Z = 2.296; p = .022) were significant at the 5 per cent 
level; and the differences on all other items were significant at the 1 per cent 
level. 
iv
 At the 5 per cent significance level. 
v
 The ‘Z scores’ for these differences were, in order, Z = -2.741 (p = .006), Z = -
2.068 (p = .039), Z = -2.168 (p = .030) and Z = -2.715 (p = .007). 
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 Table 1. Data sources 
Observations 
(14 full meetings) 
Interviews 
(11 interviews) 
Documents 
(39 key documents) 
2 Annual General 
Meetings 
6 Board Meetings 
4 Governance 
Committee Meetings 
1 Finance Committee 
Meeting 
1 Development and 
Strategy Committee 
Meeting 
Joint CEO (separate) 
Joint CEO (separate) 
Chair 
3 Independent 
directors 
2 Federation directors 
Committee member 
Senior staff member 
Joint CEOs (together) 
7 Board agendas (November 
2011 – November 2012) 
7 Sets of board minutes 
(November 2011 – November 
2012) 
10 Sets of committee minutes 
(November 2011 – November 
2012)  
4 Committee reports 
7 Annual accounts (2008 – 
2014) 
2 ‘Whole Sport Plans’ (2009-
13 and 2013-17) 
2 ‘Balanced Scorecards’ 
 
  
 Table 2. Board roles: Importance and effectiveness 
 
Board role Importance Effectiveness 
Overseeing the financial management of the NGB  3.85 3.35 
Ensuring the NGB has adequate financial systems and 
procedures  
3.63 3.19 
Setting the NGB's mission and values 3.60 2.95 
Reviewing and deciding the NGB's strategic direction  3.60 3.07 
Ensuring that the NGB fulfills its legal obligations 
(e.g. submitting annual returns)  
3.58 3.22 
Selecting and monitoring the NGB's chief executive 
and/or senior staff  
3.53 3.06 
Monitoring the NGB's performance and taking action 
when required  
3.45 2.89 
Ensuring accountability to the NGB's stakeholders  3.39 2.92 
Taking charge when things go wrong  3.39 3.02 
Recruiting new board members  3.34 2.49 
Supporting and advising management  3.33 2.85 
Representing the NGB externally  3.30 2.89 
Representing the interests of stakeholders in the NGB  3.28 3.04 
Reviewing board performance and ensuring it works 
well  
3.20 2.26 
Helping to raise funds or other resources for the NGB  3.08 2.06 
Acting as a link with important groups/organisations 
your NGB deals with  
3.00 2.90 
 Setting NGB policies (e.g. health and safety, equal 
opportunities)  
2.99 2.78 
 
 
